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Abstract 
Mobile devices continue to feature heavily in criminal investigations and often bear multiple 
forms of potentially relevant evidence. In the context of identifying the owner of a device, 
both latent fingerprints and resident digital data may be crucial to investigations, yet each 
individual process may have a detrimental impact on the other. Fingerprint development 
techniques are known to impact device hardware, whilst digital extraction processes can 
destroy latent prints. This article examines the impact of mobile device extraction procedures 
on resident screen fingerprints. The impact of bare fingered, cotton gloved, latex gloved and 
stylus screen press and swipes on latent print destruction are examined. Results indicate 
that all forms of interaction cause print damage, but to a variable extent.  Provisional device 
handling recommendations are offered. 
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1 Introduction 
Given the volume, diversity and complexity of modern day crime, many incidents require 
collaboration between sub-disciplines of forensic science in order to ensure that an effective 
investigation takes place. Frequently, there is the need to combine digital device analysis 
with what can be considered more traditional forms of forensic evidence identification and 
recovery, including DNA and fingerprints. Such recent examples in the United Kingdom (UK) 
include the examination of Closed-Circuit Television content and fingerprint analysis of 
relevant chattels at both the recent suspected arson at Nottingham’s railway station (BBC 
News, 2018a) and the Hatton Garden heist (BBC News, 2017).  
 
The need for, and requirements of, digital forensic (DF) evidence are influenced by both 
crime type and trends in device usage. Although crimes involving digital devices are difficult 
to quantify due to both direct and indirect involvement (sometimes termed cyber-dependant 
and cyber enabled (National Crime Agency, n.d.)), the UK Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology (2016) reports that now, digital evidence ‘may be present in almost every 
crime’. When coupled with usage statistics, mobile devices now form a prominent potential 
evidentiary source in many criminal cases, as noted by the College of Policing (2016, p.7-8) 
where the acquisition of phone data is a frequent cause of investigation delays and other 
court-related concerns including disclosure (BBC News, 2018b). There are almost five billion 
mobile phone users worldwide (Statista, 2018a) with a reported 96% of individuals aged 
between 16 and 24 owning a mobile phone in the UK alone (Statista, 2018b). With such 
volumes of usage comes an inferred likelihood of mobile device involvement in various acts 
of crime, where in such instances the investigation of both resident internal digital data and 
forms of resident biological and fingerprint evidence may be required.  
 
The type of offence and its surrounding circumstances will influence the forms of evidence 
recovery implemented within an investigation. An important first step in any investigation 
involves identifying the owner of any suspect device. In some cases this may be 
straightforward (for example, where a suspect acknowledges possession of a handset), 
however, a device which is located but detached from a suspect or victim poses a greater 
challenge. Whilst a device may hold masses of communication and connection data which 
may itself be attributable to a individual, accessing this content may take time (subject to 
laboratory backlogs and investigatory procedures), or in some cases a handset passcode 
may prevent access completely. As a  result, resident fingerprint evidence may provide the 
only feasible, timely alternative for device identification purposes (BBC News, 2014a; 2014b; 
2018c). Therefore at any one point in time, a single device may possess both fingerprint and 
digital evidence in need of acquisition and interpretation.  
 
This article draws specific reference to the combined forensic practices of DF and fingerprint 
recovery and analysis, in the context of mobile device investigations. Whilst the collaborative 
workings between these two disciplines on a single device is in many cases valid, there 
exists the challenge of ensuring both forensic sciences have an opportunity to carry out their 
work effectively, acquiring any potentially relevant resident evidence without compromising 
the evidential opportunities of the other. In terms of fingerprint analysis, minimal disruption to 
a mobile device’s surface is required in order to give maximum potential for print recovery. 
Yet some fingerprinting methods, for example aluminium powdering (despite being noted as 
best practice (see Section 2.1.4)), may be destructive, potentially compromising a device’s 
hardware and subsequently any digital data extraction processes. Conversely, mobile device 
analysts handling and extracting a handset must often interact with it (via it’s operating 
surface) in order to acquire and verify the internal digital content of the device. In this sense, 
fingerprinting and DF practices can conflict with one another.  
 
Within this work, the impact of a mobile handset extraction on latent fingerprints is analysed. 
We consider the scenario where a DF practitioner interacts with a device using bare fingers, 
latex gloves, touch-screen cotton gloves with screen interaction fingertips and via a generic 
device stylus. Damage to latent prints is discussed with device handling recommendations 
for DF practitioners offered.  
 
2 Device Handling Procedures 
When a mobile device is discovered at the scene of a crime with a reasonable expectation of 
the device itself or content stored within it being relevant to an investigation, necessary 
forensic examination will take place. If both fingerprint and digital data associated with the 
device are deemed to be of relevance to an investigation, and assuming both sets of 
potential evidence coexist on and within the handset itself, establishing an ‘order of 
investigation’ to ensure maximum evidence recovery is important. However, a lack of clear 
and definitive guidance on such matters regarding ‘who goes first’ makes establishing a 
suitable protocol difficult, where influencing factors may include the following: 
  
1. Triage: Procedural policies for the effective allocation of available resources 
(Horsman, 2014) may see a device enter a formal processing model, which ultimately 
determines the type of analysis a device receives first. Further, it is common practice 
in law enforcement agencies for non-technical officers to carry out a preliminary 
extraction of devices from ‘kiosk-styled’ examination pods in law enforcement 
agencies to identify the existence of any potential evidence regarding devices they 
have seized as part of an investigation. These processes may take place with little 
consideration of the application of fingerprint examination strategies.  
2. Crime prioritization: Crime prioritization is often going to be a determining factor with 
regards to the order of investigation of a mobile device. In such instances, evidence 
deemed more relevant to solving or supporting an effective investigation is likely to 
take priority, potentially to the detriment of others. In addition, cases where the 
identification of the owner of a device is pertinent and a device is found in a locked 
state (with no access to the passcode), a fingerprint examination may be a more 
efficient means of establishing ownership given the existence of backlogs for device 
examination in many law enforcement and associated  institutions (Quick and Choo, 
2014; Scanlon, 2016; Scanlon et al., 2017). Although prioritization decisions are likely 
based on surrounding case circumstances they may not be effective in all cases, 
therefore consideration for the preservation of both evidence types is arguably 
necessary.  
3. Available expertise: A device may receive a form of analysis based on the type of 
practitioner which first encounters said device. For example, a device found through 
a scene search which is carried out by DF experts may have digital evidence 
prioritized and undergo a digital device extraction first, or in some cases, without the 
consideration for FP evidence. In addition, a scene search or device seizure 
undertaken by a generic law enforcement officer (non-DF or fingerprint specialist), 
may result in variation of analysis prioritisation due to localised examination policies.  
4. An afterthought: Ineffective planning may result in either form of evidence being 
considered as an afterthought of the other. In addition, subsequent case 
developments may require further device analysis for other forms of evidence which 
were not originally examined. Therefore a device which is deemed to first require DF 
analysis, with a subsequently initiated fingerprint examination, may have had any 
fingerprint evidence compromised by the DF procedures.    
 
The issue lies with the potential for destruction to be caused by each procedure. This 
problem is summarised by Androulidakis (2016, p.79) who indicates that digital data 
extraction may destroy fingerprint evidence, whilst conversely, fingerprint procedures may 
disrupt the operation of a handset.  
 
In relation to fingerprint recovery, whilst the position is unclear and subject to variables such 
as the make and model of a device, commentary suggests the use of metallic flake powders, 
such as aluminium, to recover prints should be prohibited due to the potential for damage 
being caused to the device (Girard, 2017). This concern has also been previously issued by 
the Association of Chief Police Officers (2007) in their ‘Good Practice Guide for Computer-
Based Electronic Evidence’ and by Curran et al. (2010) and Casey (2011).  Ballou (2010) 
acknowledges the need for both sources of evidence to be acquired, however they suggest 
that potentially destructive fingerprint evidence procedures should be second to digital 
extractions.  
 
2.1 Existing Procedural Guidance 
As previously noted, there is limited commentary available for establishing an effective ‘order 
of play’ between fingerprint and digital device examination. Whilst comments surrounding 
damage may be valid, Murphy (2009) indicates that prevention of “contamination issues” is a 
key driver, however arguably this could be addressed via a DF practitioner having their 
fingerprints eliminated from any subsequent investigation. Whilst perhaps not helpful in 
terms of establishing a definitive solution, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 
(SWGDE) provide the following guidance. 
 
“Occasionally, there may be a need to conduct traditional forensic processes on 
a mobile phone (e.g., DNA and latent prints). These are case dependent and 
should be discussed with the investigator about the need for such evidence as 
well as the order in which they should be performed. Contact appropriate lab 
personnel for guidance on processing order to avoid the destruction of forensic 
evidence.” (SWGDE, 2013). 
 
Such guidance is mirrored by the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (2015) 
(ENFSI) who state. 
 
If at the scene there is a likely requirement to work with other forensic 
departments, for example DNA or fingerprints, then the sequence of work should 
follow an agreed pre-defined sequence that is dependent on the importance and 
destructive nature of each forensic process. 
 
A lack of definitive guidance may lead to divergent examination processes occurring both at 
a local and international level. Such inconsistencies may lead to variations in the success 
rates of combined evidence recovery from mobile devices or in some cases, the 
unnecessary destruction of specific evidence types.  
 
2.1 Damage 
There is limited academic commentary available discussing both the robustness of 
fingerprint evidence during a DF extraction, and the impact of a DF extraction on latent prints 
on a device’s screen. This work aims to address both points. In essence, the key factor for 
deliberation here is the ‘order of evidence volatility’, a concept typically associated with 
digital evidence collection (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002). One should consider that latent 
fingerprints may be subject to destruction via the extraction procedure itself or simply 
through handling the device. 
 
2.1.1 Mobile Forensic Extraction Procedure 
Mobile device examination is a sub-discipline of DF where procedures are difficult to 
standardise due to variances in handset makes and models, coupled with multiple operating 
system instances in operating. Practitioners are often wholly reliant on their forensic 
extraction software to communicate and extract resident data, with Figure 1 providing an 
overview of the typical analysis process.  
 
 
Figure 1: A High-level overview of a mobile forensic examination 
 
Initial Handling: Initial handling is dependent on the context of a device’s seizure and journey 
through an examination process. If a device has been seized onsite, it is subject to both the 
seizing officers handling and then handling of the examining DF practitioner once it is within 
the confines of the laboratory. Typically, devices are contained in protective packaging until 
they are removed at an examination station.  Depending on the type of packaging employed 
it may, or may not, preserve the fingerprint evidence on the device. If seizure is carried out 
by those lacking knowledge of requisite packaging standards then additional latent print 
damage may occur. Rigid, non-porous objects such as  the devices discussed here should 
ideally be packaged in a box if subsequent fingerprint examination is envisaged (Fisher and 
Fisher, 2012).  
 
Localised policies for device seizure may also vary. If a device is found switched on, local 
practices may dictate that the device is turned off, preventing it from interacting further with 
outside communication networks whilst also preventing any remote wiping processes. If a 
first responder handles a device failing to consider latent fingerprints on a device screen, 
subsequent damage to fingerprints is likely to be caused.  
 
Connect: Once in a laboratory environment (or examination environment if on-scene triage 
occurs), extraction of a device’s digital content is required. Although in some instances non-
cable extractions are possible (Bluetooth, Infrared etc.), in the case of most modern 
handsets, a cable connection is required. This requires various degrees of device handling 
and whilst a standard USB or equivalent charging/data cable can be connected without 
touching a device screen, it may not always be done in such a manner.  
 
Extraction: Once a connection has been established, extraction can take place. The 
extraction process typically requires a practitioner to interact with a device’s screen (to 
varying degrees, based on a handsets make/model and the extraction software in use) in 
order to configure and commence an extraction. The extraction process is often software 
wizard driven, but in many cases requires elements of device interaction and the placing of a 
handset into a certain ‘state’ for data extraction. For example, a practitioner may have to 
enter a handset’s passcode in order to get access to the device, navigate device menus, 
secure it from network connections (remove data/Wi-Fi connections to prevent remote 
wiping etc.), enable USB debugging and enable process dialog boxes for data extraction to 
take place (for example, in the case of iPhone devices, a ‘trusted connection’ may need 
initiating). All actions require screen contact, typically by hand or through the use of a 
compatible stylus device.  
 
Results Validation: Once an extraction is complete, the practitioner has two options. First, 
they can take the results as ‘unverified’, power down the device and repackage it. In this 
instance, the practitioner is relying on the accurate interpretative quality of the analysis 
software where any further analysis takes place on the extracted data set. Arguably, this is 
unsafe practice, leaving a second option of ‘sampled verification’. In many investigation 
instances, it is unrealistic to validate every piece of extracted data from a handset, but 
sampling should take place in order to identify any information which may not have been 
acquired during the extraction process, or extracted with misrepresented metadata (for 
example, incorrect artefact time stamps). To provide an example, where 100 Short Message 
Service (SMS) have been extracted, good practice includes the sampling of messages on 
the handset to ensure the accuracy of an extraction, in terms of quantity of SMS in 
existence, and to verify that associated metadata is correctly reported. The results validation 
stage of an investigation has the potential to require a large volume of screen interaction and 
potential fingerprint destruction. 
 
*Extraction Point of Note*: Where a handset cannot be extracted via forensic software, a live 
examination and recording of screen content may be the only implementable option. This 
method essentially explores the handset’s functionality and data as a main user would, via 
handset interaction. In this case, the implication of screen engagement for fingerprint 
recovery may be severe.   
 
2.1.2 Device Handling  
In almost all cases of device handling for the preservation of fingerprints, the subconscious 
actions of a practitioner must be considered. If they are aware of the need to subsequently 
fingerprint a device, then cautious methods of handling may be implemented.  For example, 
the practitioner could specifically handle a device using methods which do not disturb the 
large, flat surface areas of a screen where latent and recoverable prints may reside. 
However the definition of ‘cautious handling’ is subjective and may vary between 
practitioners. Of concern is the lack of handling guidance available to DF practitioners and 
the impact this may have on personal protective equipment (PPE) usage.  
 
Best practices for DF practitioners handling mobile exhibits in need of fingerprinting is 
sparse, typically resulting in the use of latex or cotton gloves by a practitioner. Such 
measures are often perceived as for the purposes of avoiding device contamination, 
preventing a practitioner’s prints from being placed on the device’s surface. In reality, this is 
of limited concern where a practitioner's fingerprints could easily be recorded and eliminated. 
The primary justification for the use of such measures by a DF practitioner is to either limit or 
prohibit the destruction of latent fingerprints. Whilst the rationale for gloved approaches is 
sound, at the time of writing there is no available research  in relation to this. As a result, an 
inference merely exists that the acts of touching the screen by a DF practitioner will likely 
result in evidence damage, given that fingerprints on smooth surfaces such as glass are 
typically vulnerable to damage (European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2015b).  
 
2.1.3 Damage to the Handset 
The discipline operates under the inference that the application of any fingerprint powder to 
a device creates a risk of damage to internal hardware and functionality if powder ingress 
occurs. This issue is particularly pertinent where magnetic powders are utilised. However, 
this should be considered against developments in modern handset technology. Mobile 
devices are now constructed typically using enclosed cases where the battery compartment 
can no longer be opened (see for example, Apple and Samsung Galaxy handsets).  These 
have limited points of entry, except for (typically) charging, earphone and speaker entry 
points which compromise the structure of a case.  
    
2.1.4 Fingerprint Recovery 
The majority of mobile phone devices are comprised of one of nine different types of 
GorillaⓇ Glass screen (Corning, 2018), including the Apple iPhone which has been 
manufactured with a GorillaⓇ G lass screen since 2007 (A pple, 2017). The glass is 
surrounded by a thin metal strip, which acts as an antenna, and the phone exterior/back 
tends to be composed of plastic, in either rough, matt or high-gloss finishes.   
 
According to the Fingerprint Visualisation Manual (CAST, 2014), the glass screen of a 
mobile device is categorised as ‘Glass and Ceramics’ of the ‘non-porous’ surfaces.  After a 
visual examination, the cheapest and easiest process for the recovery of fingerprint evidence 
from this surface type is undertaken with the use of powders, usually aluminium powder.  A 
smooth plastic phone casing, considered as a ‘Rigid Plastic’, would have fingerprints 
recovered in the same way.  However, depending on the extent of the grain of a rough or 
matt plastic, powders may prove to be ineffective and vacuum metal deposition or superglue 
treatment may well be the technique of choice. 
 
Powders will adhere to the aqueous component of fresh fingerprints and to the fatty deposits 
of sebaceous sweat in older prints where the water has evaporated. Vacuum metal 
deposition, a highly sensitive technique, relies on the layering of gold deposits, followed by 
zinc.  The zinc creates a grey uniform layer across the item, except where the fingerprints 
are located (Jones et al, 2001). Superglue vapour (ethyl cyanoacrylate) is believed to 
catalysed into a white powder by the water and some other components of fingerprints.  The 
deposition of fibrous growths is subsequently dyed with fluorescent dye in order to visualise 
the fingerprints (Home Office Scientific Development Branch, 2005). 
 
The analysis of the friction ridge detail of a fingerprint is based on: “ridge flow and ridge 
paths; the location, direction, and spatial relationships of minutiae; and ridge structure” 
(SWGFAST, 2013).  The subsequent determination of the quantitative and qualitative levels 
of ‘detail’, and establishment of suitability of the print for comparative purposes, occurs 
before comparison, evaluation and the formation of conclusions relating to identification (or 
not).  The levels of ‘detail’ are categorised as: Level 1 - overall ridge flow; Level 2 - 
individualised and relative arrangements of friction ridge paths and friction ridge events; and 
Level 3 - ridge structures and their relative arrangements (SWGFAST, 2013).  Examination, 
analysis and comparison are reliant on the competency and expertise of the fingerprint 
examiner, before an evaluation occurs.  The evaluation results in one of four conclusions 
being reached: 1. exclusion; 2. individualisation, 3. inconclusive; and 4. return to the analysis 
phase. 
 
The whole process is known as the ACE-V methodology - Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation 
and Verification. This is not an entirely linear course of action, as previous phases can be 
returned to. Additionally, a trained fingerprint examiner will understand and take into 
consideration a range of factors which can impact upon the examination.  These include, but 
are not limited to, the condition of the skin, the pressure maintained during transfer, the 
substrate onto which the print is transferred and the presence/absence of secretions 
(SWGFAST, 2013). As there are so many competing variables to consider in fingerprint 
examination, there is no threshold against which a fingerprint could be classed as 
'identifiable' versus one which is not. Therefore, the aim of any procedure being carried out 
on the device would be to cause the minimal amount of damage to any latent prints.  
 
3 Methodology 
In this article, Apple portable devices are the subject of analysis and discussion as reported 
sales of Apple iPhone devices topped 200 million in 2017 (Statista, 2018g). Whilst 
considering potential issues for fingerprint recovery post DF analysis, Section 3 offers an 
analysis and evaluation of the impact of a mobile forensic extraction on a handset’s screen. 
There are two fundamental research questions which are addressed in this work, noted as 
follows: 
 
1. How destructive is a typical mobile device analysis procedure on latent fingerprints? 
2. Can certain methods of device interaction (including bare finger, latex glove, touch 
screen cotton glove and stylus) reduce latent fingerprint destruction on a device 
screen?  
 
Section 4 offers test results and is set out as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 offer a device 
‘screen-map’, identifying typical screen interactions in two scenarios. The first (Section 4.1), 
documents a control test documents the typical screen interactions carried out by a 
practitioner when forensically acquiring data from an Apple device. The second (Section 4.2) 
describes what this article coins as ‘impact quantification’; an example of the potential 
resident fingerprints left after a device user has typically utilised popular iOS applications, 
and the impact of a subsequent device extraction by a practitioner upon these fingerprint 
regions. Section 4.3 examines the impact of PPE usage by a DF practitioner when 
interaction with a device screen in order to extract it’s digital content. Four scenarios are 
evaluated - bare fingered extract, using latex gloves, using touch screen cotton gloves and 
using a stylus. 
 
3.1 Examination interactions with exemplar fingerprints 
In order to assess the impact of the four conditions noted above on latent fingerprints on a 
device, the following methodology was utilised. To provide a large surface area upon which 
to work, an iPad was used for the deposition of fingerprints (both iPhone and iPads utilise 
GorillaⓇ screen glass). After careful cleaning, a series of eight plain impressions were 
deposited down the length of the iPad screen, with the thumbs being wiped before the first 
and subsequent depositions. Plain impressions (where fingers are placed flat on a surface 
without rolling) were used to provide a recognisable target for the interactions.  This enabled 
the interactions to be placed entirely within the body of the latent print using the latent print 
itself to delineate the damage.  
 
Each print was left for 1 hour before being interacted with in one of the following ways: 1) 
bare fingered press, 2) bare fingered swipe, 3) latex gloved fingered press, 4) latex glove 
fingered swipe, 5) touch screen gloved press, 6) touch screen gloved swipe, 7) stylus press, 
and 8) stylus swipe. The screen press and swipe were used to simulate the two actions a 
practitioner must typically perform on a device screen in order to interact with it. A passive 
universal stylus, which included a large tip made of conductive material (7.5 mm diameter), 
was used rather than a ballpoint pen-like tipped active pen, as these latter devices did not 
appear to interact and operate the screen of the test Apple device. 
 
The iPads were dusted with Aluminium powder and visual examination was completed using 
an Integrated Rapid Imaging System (IRIS) and suitable imagery captured for evaluation.  
 
Limitations: - This work has analysed the recoverability of fingerprints from Apple devices 
which utilize GorillaⓇ screen glass. Whilst an inference is made that the results offered are 
applicable to other smartphone screen glass, such a statement cannot be said with certainty 
and is therefore a limitation of this article. However, the current list of products which 
possess GorillaⓇ screen glass is comprehensive and includes most common device 
manufacturers and device types, including smartphones, tablets, slates, notebooks and 
wearables (Corning, 2018). Further, our testing focuses on the screen surface of the 
handset, omitting to consider fingerprint recovery from the sides and back of devices. This 
decision has been taken in order to reduce the number of variables in need of consideration 
for testing so that focus could be maintained on fingerprint destruction. Whilst not making the 
assumption that fingerprints are non-recoverable from surfaces other than the screen, both 
surface area and device handling (putting a device on a textured surface for example), 
suggest that there is a greater chance of undamaged fingerprints being resident on a screen, 
given that this is the surface for interacting with a device. In addition, with an increase in 
what are described as ‘three-quarter cases’ which protect both the back and sides of a 
device from damage, thereby leaving the screen accessible, fingerprints on other portions of 
the device may not be available, particularly if the case consists of a textured, non-printable 
surface.  
  
4 Results 
Section 4 presents the results of both the controlled and actual fingerprint tests.  
 
4.1 Control Test  
Figure 2 depicts the touches which occur when extracting an iPhone 7 device (for testing, 
AXIOM and XRY procedures were utilised).  This provides an initial indication of what this 
article will term ‘screen impact’ which is the result of touching a mobile device screen in 
order to extract data from it. 
 
 
Figure 2: A map of screen touches during a forensic extraction of an iPhone 7.  Red 
marks indicate static mandatory procedural touches. Green marks are handling 
touches. Orange marks are mandatory touches, but ‘moveable’ (mandatory navigation 
touches).  
 
*Points of interest: Forensic extraction principles will typically maintain the same standard 
operating procedure for the same make and model of handset. Therefore, extractions for 
iPhone 7 handsets utilising the same forensic extraction tool will have screen impact 
characteristics typical of those noted in Figure 2. However, there are three variables which 
are subject to change during examinations. The first is the imposition of a device handset 
lock. In the test case presented, a pincode of ‘2580’ was resident on the device, resulting in 
a central line of mandatory (red) presses due to the location of the onscreen pin-pad. 
Different device handset locks will result in different mandatory press locations.  
 
Second, device handling touches (documented in green) are due to handling the device 
throughout the examination (for example, removal from packaging, connecting the device 
etc.). Whilst arguably, a device can be handled in less impactful ways (for example, holding 
the sides of a device), this may not always be a prominent thought of the practitioner. In this 
case, we examined typical device handling procedures where the examining practitioner was 
under instructions to treat the device ‘as per typical procedure’. Assuming that device 
handling touches will appear on the handset screen, these are not static and therefore may 
impact the screen in different locations and sizes depending on how a practitioner typically 
handles mobile exhibits and factors such as whether they are left or right handed. Finally 
there are non-static mandatory touches (shown as orange). These touches must be made by 
a practitioner to navigate device menus (in this case, to swipe to a secondary home screen 
to enter the ‘settings’ of the device). Whilst these may vary in location, navigation of the 
device via such touches is needed.  
 
Static mandatory procedural touches (red) refer to screen locations which must be pressed 
in order to prepare for or initiate an extraction. For example, when an iOS device requires 
the practitioner to enable a ‘Trusted Connection’, this is typically a prompt in the center of the 
screen which must be pressed. Other issues include checking iOS versions and disabling 
networked connections for device integrity purposes. 
 
Whilst arguments for poor handling processes could be made following Figure 2, it must be 
considered with the fact that there is limited guidance in terms of best practice handling 
procedures for DF examiners. Therefore handling marks generated during the course of an 
examination may vary wildly in terms of quantity and placement. Further, DF practitioners 
are often not knowledgeable of traditional forensic science evidence recovery methods.  
Therefore, in the absence of training, it would be unfair to place the assumed burden of 
preserving fingerprint evidence on a device screen without effectively evaluating and 
educating them on such processes.    
 
Finally, in regards to screen impact, this must be considered against the fact that modern 
smartphones, including the iPhone, operate a dynamic desktop environment where 
applications can be created, moved  and removed. Therefore, it is difficult to establish with 
100% consistency where a practitioner may have to press in all instances due to potential 
variances in device configurations by the user. Figure 2 also documents a process which is 
solely for the purpose of extracting device data. No ‘manual verification of data’ processes 
(see Figure 1) have been mapped, which would significantly increase the volume of 
practitioner screen touches. 
 
4.2 Assessing Impact: User Fingerprint quantification 
Given that Figure 2 documents the typical mobile screen impact following an extraction, such 
actions must be evaluated against typical device usage and the subsequent deposition of 
their fingerprints from these actions. Figure 3 denotes the typical screen presses following 
usage of the Facebook [over 2 billion users (Statista, 2018f)], Twitter [330 million users 
(Statista, 2018e)], WhatsApp [1.3 billion users in 2017 (Statista, 2018d)] and YouTube [over 
200 million video viewers as of 2016 in the United States alone (Statista, 2018c)] 
applications. In each case, the screen press locations recorded in Figure 3 (translucent 
marks) are as a result of the user interacting with core functions of each application 
retrospectively. These marks overlay those of a practitioner who carries out a typical device 
extraction so that potential areas of destruction can be identified. For example, in the case of 
Twitter, screen press locations are typical of a user who scrolls down their ‘Twitter-feed’, 
searches for tweets/users, examines their notifications and private messages, and creates a 
tweet from their account. As each application maintains a consistently formatted user 
interface, these regions of impact are consistent for anyone who utilises these applications 
on a mobile device with a comparable screen size.  
 
Points to note:- The touch maps offered in Figure 3 provide an indication of the marks 
generated by a handset user, their position and ultimately their potential for destruction by 
those of a practitioner during a forensic extraction of the device. Whilst there are multiple 
places a user can leave fingerprints on their device, placement is likely to coincide with key 
functional areas of their device. As a result, regardless of the volume of usage received on a 
handset (which may affect the quality of fingerprint recovery), a maximum capacity will be 
reached before subsequent prints overwrite those in existence. It is key to note, that for 
simplicity purposes, Figure 3’s defining of regions of interest assumes that fingerprints may 
be recoverable from such positions. However in reality it is not this simple. The consistency 
of application interfaces leads to repetition of tasks which can cause print-on-print damage 
(multiple prints overlayed, making identification difficult or in some cases, not possible). This 
means that regardless of damage caused by a practitioner, fingerprints may never have 
been recoverable in the first instance. Whist all apps maintain their own unique selling points 
and functionality, most adopt sound principles of user experience and design whilst 
engaging with standard operating system functions, such as the keyboard. The result of this 
is an overlap in typical print locations, regardless of the application in use. For example, 
where a user must type, the iOS virtual QWERTY keyboard covers the bottom third of the 
device. In addition, key application menu bars and icons are often pinned to both the top and 
bottom of the screen. As these must be pressed to use these applications, they are key 
locations for latent fingerprint recovery.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A touch map of Twitter (top-left), Facebook (top-right), WhatsApp (bottom-
left) and YouTube (bottom-right). A DF practitioner extraction marks (as noted in 
Figure 2) are present, where the transparent marks overlaid are typical of a user’s 
interaction with each respective application - indicating potential print-area damage.   
 
 
 
4.2.1 Quantification of Destruction 
It is important to note that fingerprint experts do not always require full fingerprints in order to 
facilitate the identification of a print and therefore the analysis presented in Figures 2 and 3 
provides an inferred indication of regional areas where destruction may occur. Fingerprint 
practitioners typically operate on the premise that the greater the quantity of a print 
recovered during examination, the more likely it is that identification can be made. Table 1 
provides a summary of the print recovery locations noted in Figure 3 from each of the four 
applications. In all cases, there is only one region which would not be impacted upon by a 
practitioner's extraction prints. 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of full and partial fingerprint locations. 
 Facebook Twitter WhatsApp YouTube 
No. potential full print locations 1 1 1 1 
No. print locations with minor damage  8 6 5 4 
 
4.3 Examination interactions with exemplar fingerprints 
This section provides the results following the use of forms of PPE to press and swipe latent 
fingerprints. The first test examines the impact of a DF practitioner who interacts with a 
device without any form of personal protective equipment (PPE). A non-gloved examination 
revealed the impact of print-on-print damage, as well as the damage caused by a bare finger 
swipe. Other forms of common PPE an examiner may opt to utilise during a device 
examination include latex gloves, cotton gloves (with screen interaction ability) and a device 
stylus. All four test conditions have been examined, shown in Figure 4 (colour reversed for 
clarity).  
 
 
Figure 4: Example fingermarks following subsequent examiner device interaction and 
aluminium powdering. The effects of a bare finger press and swipe are shown in (1). 
The effects of a latex glove press and swipe are shown in (2). The effects of a cotton 
glove press and swipe are shown in (3). The effects of a stylus press and swipe are 
shown in (4).  
 
Bare finger press (1 - left): This interaction is capable of overwriting the latent print with the 
examiner’s  own mark. The exact appearance will depend on the donor mark and the relative 
orientation of the examiner’s fingers in relation to it. The examiner’s print is clearly seen at 
centre left of the much larger plain impression, and is more visible due to a 90° rotation. The 
problems caused by overlapping marks have been rehearsed elsewhere, notably during the 
debate about the provenance of Y7 at the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry (Campbell, 2011). 
 
Bare finger swipe (1 - right): This interaction has removed an area of the latent print broadly 
equal to the width of the swiping finger in contact multiplied by the length of the swipe. 
Swipes are easily recognised by the characteristic appearance after fingerprint treatment, 
which is of convex circular ends connected by a broadly rectangular feature of variable 
straightness. The circular ends may retain 2-dimensional details of the tip of the swiping 
object. Here, ridge detail from the examiner is visible at the left hand end of the swipe. (The 
swipes took place from left-to-right in all instances)  
 
Latex glove press  (2 - left): The outcome of this interaction is variable even within this single 
mark. There is an obviously disturbed area with rather ill-defined diffuse edges in the centre 
of the plain impression where the latex glove has been pressed, but close examination at 
high magnification shows that the degree of disruption of the ridge detail, although severe, 
varies. 
 
Latex glove swipe  (2 - right): This interaction typically removes an area of the latent print 
broadly equal to the width of the swiping latex glove in contact multiplied by the length of the 
swipe. As noted in (1 - right), swipes are easily recognised by the characteristic appearance 
after fingerprint treatment. 
 
Cotton glove press (3 - left): The outcome of this interaction is variable even within this 
single mark. There is an obviously disturbed area with rather ill-defined diffuse edges in the 
centre of the plain impression where the cotton glove has been pressed, but close 
examination at high magnification shows that the degree of disruption of the ridge detail 
varies from complete obliteration to still recognisable ridges. 
 
Cotton glove swipe (3 - right): This interaction typically affects an area of the latent print 
broadly equal to the width of the swiping cotton glove in contact multiplied by the length of 
the swipe. As before, swipes are easily recognised by the characteristic appearance after 
fingerprint treatment. In this instance however the degree of disruption is again variable, 
along the length of the swipe, from complete obliteration to clearly recognisable ridges.  
 
Stylus press (4 - left): This interaction damage is limited to the circular stylus tip area. The 
particular stylus used here has a 7.5mm diameter soft, hollow rubber tip and it tends to turn 
inside out on contact so that it becomes convex to the surface, resulting in a domed space 
which is in contact with the latent print only around the stylus perimeter. This results in 
survival of ridge detail within the stylus tip area, albeit somewhat degraded in this instance.  
 
Stylus swipe (4 - right): This interaction typically affects an area of the latent print broadly 
equal to the diameter of the swiping stylus in contact multiplied by the length of the swipe. 
Again the swipe is easily recognised by the characteristic appearance.  Close examination 
shows that while disruption is severe it is by no means total. A short length of at least seven 
ridges is visible in the lower center of the swipe. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Preliminary findings indicate that all four approaches (bare finger, latex glove, touch screen 
cotton glove and stylus) result in some damage to the latent print.  This damage varies in 
both the degree of obliteration of the latent print and the area of the print which is obliterated. 
In all instances, the act of swiping is many times more damaging to the latent print than 
pressing.  This result is not unexpected, given the act of swiping across a latent print 
automatically covers a greater area in comparison to a press.  The approach that resulted in 
the least damage to the latent print was through the use of the stylus. Overall, the other 
approaches (latex glove, cotton touch screen, bare finger) can be grouped as one, being 
appreciably more damaging than the stylus, at least within this limited study..  Combining the 
practical data with the control tests, it is clear that the process of digital evidence extraction 
has an impact upon the latent prints on the device being extracted. Although a FP examiner 
does not always need a complete print in order to use it for identification purposes, as 
previously outlined the aim would be to limit, as much as possible, the potential for damage 
to occur. The number of partial prints inferred from the touch maps shows that there are 
many FPs which are likely to be damaged by a DF extraction procedure, and thus the 
examiner should try to ensure that this damage is kept to a minimum. Thus, in order to 
minimise damage to latent prints on the surface of a device during digital evidence 
extraction, a stylus should be utilised, limiting interactions to presses rather than swipes 
where possible.  This approach would minimise the disruption to the mobile device’s surface, 
thereby giving the maximum potential for recovery of fingerprints. 
 
The use of a stylus to interact with the surface of the device during a DF extraction needs to 
be considered further in relation to the type of stylus and the size of its tip. The stylus 
employed within this study was a passive universal stylus with a large tip.  The tip was 7.5 
mm in diameter, expanding to 9 mm when fully depressed, and, as a consequence, the 
interaction with the fingerprint in both press and swipe was between those widths depending 
on the pressure applied. A smaller, ballpoint pen-tipped active pen may well cause 
significantly less damage as a consequence of the smaller surface area touching the device.  
The active pen offers a wider range of options with respect to usability such as input buttons 
and touch sensitivity, which may alter the manner in with a DF extraction can occur, thereby 
resulting in an even greater reduction in damage to any latent prints present on the device.  
However, in this instance, two examples of active pens were tested on the iPad devices and 
neither pen interacted with the device in such a way as to allow an extraction.  An examiner 
would, therefore, need to ensure that the stylus employed was able to interact with and 
operate the device being examined, or identify and utilise an active pen which was 
universally suitable.  
 
With regards to the utilisation of any finger-based extraction method (bare finger, cotton 
touch screen glove, latex glove), consideration is needed in respect to the sensitivity of the 
device screen and the force needed to interact with it during the data extraction. For 
example, the pressure that was required to interact with the device screen whilst wearing a 
pair of touch screen cotton gloves was considerable and resulted in greater damage. Bare 
fingered touches produced the second lowest level of damage but, given the likelihood of the 
need to take into account DNA-based evidence, this method of DF extraction may be 
unsuitable. 
 
5.1 Future Work 
This work has offered a preliminary analysis of the DF examination impact on latent screen 
fingerprints. As a result of analysis, the following areas are offered as considerations for 
future work. 
 
The effect of ageing of fingerprints on the outcome of an examination: As devices may be 
examined both immediately due to triage procedures and in some cases subject to backlogs 
of multiple months in length, latent prints with a range of ages will be encountered. The 
composition of a latent print is affected over time, principally by moisture loss (Farrugia et al, 
2015), but also through changes to the sebaceous material present (Archer et al., 2005). As 
powders adhere to the fatty deposits of sebaceous sweat in older prints, a longitudinal study 
is required to assess the vulnerability of latent marks to damage during the interactions of a 
DF practitioner during data extraction of a device. 
 
Pressure: Pressure is also likely to have a role in the damage of latent prints. Work is 
needed to establish a threshold at which the minimal pressure can be applied in order to 
obtain a response from a device screen. An assessment is also required in order to establish 
the level of pressure needed which results in damage to a print.   
 
Mark Types: In this work, assumptions have been that latent prints are plain impressions (full 
fingerprints). However, when a user interacts with their device, a range of latent prints may 
be generated from various surface areas, including the very tip of the finger. The impact of a 
DF extraction upon a range of different types of user generated marks, particular the very tip 
of the finger, should be examined.  
 
Impact of Aluminum powder on modern devices: This work has operated on the assumption 
that aluminium powder can be potentially destructive to mobile devices following  
acknowledgments made in literature (Girard, 2017) and best practice guidelines (CAST, 
2014). Further testing is required to examine the impact of fingerprint powder types on the 
function of mobile handsets in order to assess the risks posed by this form of fingerprint 
recovery. 
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